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Abstract 
 
Considerable empirical evidence supports the 
existence of numerous conceptual metaphors, and 
suggests that much of cognitive structure is 
represented as a function of embodied experiences. 
However, it is not clear to what extent “all 
metaphors are created equal”, or whether some 
metaphors enjoy a more privileged status than 
others. In this chapter, two main features of 
embodied experience are identified that are likely to 
provide the basis for a range of fundamental 
metaphors. First, the body is a container with a clear 
boundary that keeps it separate from other objects 
and people. Second, the body is situated in space 
and moves in it while maintaining varying distances 
to objects and people. From these basic properties 
of the body the following image schemas and 
associated metaphors are derived: First, verticality 
provides a sources domain to distinguish between 
good and bad on the most fundamental level. 
Second, the notion that the body is a container 
shapes the understanding of many emotional and 
social processes. Third, spatial distance facilitates 
an understanding of immediate and close, versus 
distant and remote concerns. Spatial distance relates 
to objects external to the body that are either kept 
close, incorporated or instead, are rejected, expelled 
and condemned. This has relevance for other 
people, because physical closeness further implies 
physical warmth, which in itself stands for social 
connection. Evidence is reviewed to suggest that 
these are likely candidates for basic metaphors that 
are universal across different cultures.  
 
More than 20 years ago Paul Ekman provocatively 
asked the question of whether there are basic 
emotions (Ekman, 1992a; 1992b). He argued that 
specific facial expressions and underlying 
physiological reactions involved in emotional 
experiences suggest that the answer to this question 
is “yes.” Ekman, and many others who noted the 
universality of emotion, attributed a fundamental 
role of physical experience to emotion. Although 
some of the questions posted at the time remain 
heavily discussed and disputed (Barrett, 2006; 
Panksepp, 2007), in present social psychology 
related considerations have not just involved 
emotion, but more generally the role of physical 
experiences in shaping the cognitive processing of 
social phenomena. Following researchers in other 
areas of cognitive science (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; 
2008; Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), 
social psychologists have started to emphasize the 
benefits of an embodied view of cognition, based on 
the notion that functioning in the world with 
specific bodily capabilities fundamentally 
constrains cognitive processes (e.g., Meier, Schnall, 
Schwarz, & Bargh, in press; Niedenthal, Barsalou, 
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Smith & 
Semin, 2004; Spellman & Schnall, 2009).  
In contrast to traditional theories of 
cognition, according to embodied approaches, 
cognitive processes do not have the goal of arriving 
at a mirror image of the world, but rather, cognitive 
processes allow humans to successfully act in their 
physical and social world. Thus, one of the main 
assumptions of embodied cognition is that the 
human body constrains action and its regulation, 
and as a consequence, produces a cognitive 
apparatus that facilitates action. This view has some 
early precursors (see, for example, Gibson, 1979; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1962); however, cognitive scientists 
have largely studied “high-level” cognitive 
processes as divorced from any “low-level” 
perceptual or motor input processes (for a history of 
“disembodied” cognitive science, see Johnson, 1987; 
Spellman & Schnall, 2009). In contrast, with 
conceptual structures that are defined by 
“interactional” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), or 
“experiential” (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) 
properties of the world, the boundaries between 
perception, cognition and action become 
increasingly fluid (Barsalou, 1999; Clark, 1997). 
Because mental representations that are due to 
interactions with the environment retain the 
modality of perceptual experience, the resulting 
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concepts are considered to involve re-enactments, or 
simulations of such perceptual processes (Barsalou, 
1999; Glenberg, 1997).  
One of the earliest embodied approaches 
originated within cognitive linguistics in the form of 
the theory of conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980; 1999), which proposed that bodily 
processes shape and constrain cognitive information 
processing. Metaphor, defined as “understanding 
and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of 
another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 5, emphasis in 
original)” does not only concern language usage, 
but is informative about underlying cognitive 
structure, because abstract concepts that are 
described metaphorically often reflect basic 
physical experiences.  
Whereas early work on metaphor theory was 
primarily confined to linguistics and involved 
cataloguing lists of metaphoric expressions and 
their potential links to basic physical experience, 
recent empirical research conducted within social 
psychology has increasingly confirmed the 
metaphoric basis of many cognitive processes (for a 
review, see Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010). 
Testing the potential existence of embodied 
metaphors has become a highly productive 
enterprise, with research papers on new metaphoric 
connections between physical experiences and 
social phenomena accumulating at a rapid pace. 
However, although this growing literature supports 
the notion that embodied metaphors play a critical 
role in social thought and behavior, a wide range of 
metaphors has been examined without much 
consideration regarding which specific metaphors 
might constitute basic, or “core” metaphors. Indeed, 
critical discussions have pointed to the short-lived 
strategy of moving from metaphor to metaphor 
without taking into account what underlying 
processes and mechanisms might be at play (Landau 
et al., 2010; Meier et al., in press). In particular, if 
metaphors are indeed the building blocks of 
cognitive representation, how many and which such 
metaphors are required to arrive at a comprehensive 
conceptual structure? Given the vast number of 
bodily experiences to draw upon for mappings of 
physical concepts onto abstract target concepts, are 
there any bodily experiences that are more 
fundamental than others? In other words, given the 
evidence, is there any reason to believe that there 
are basic embodied metaphors?  
The goal of this chapter is to extract a 
number of basic metaphors to guide future empirical 
investigations. What is first needed, however, is a 
working definition of what might make certain 
embodied concepts especially central, or basic. 
Ultimately, cross-cultural investigations and 
longitudinal studies following children’s early 
development will need to establish the extent to 
which some physical experiences, and their 
applications to abstract concepts, are universal. Do 
date, however, such investigations have been scarce 
(but see Casasanto, this volume). In the meantime, 
one possibility to determine which metaphors can 
be considered “basic” is to examine the extent to 
which a given source domain, that is, a concrete 
physical experience, can be used to understand a 
wide range of target domains, namely structurally 
dissimilar abstract concepts that otherwise are 
difficult to understand. Thus, for a given bodily 
concept to be a good candidate for a basic metaphor, 
it should have applicability to a wide range of target 
concepts, and therefore be instrumental in 
understanding and influencing a variety of cognitive, 
behavioral and social phenomena related to those 
abstract concepts.  
This chapter will review the evidence for the 
existence of a number of putatively basic bodily 
metaphors, based on the following two fundamental 
observations: First, the body is a container with a 
clear boundary that keeps it separate from other 
people, and objects. Second, the body is situated in 
space and moves in it while maintaining varying 
distances to objects and people. From these basic 
properties of the body the following metaphors are 
derived, which may be considered as relatively 
basic: First, verticality provides a source domain to 
distinguish between good and bad entities in 
multiple contexts. Second, the fact that the body is a 
container is implicit in the conceptualization of 
many emotional and social processes. Third, spatial 
distance contrasts things and people that are close 
from those that are distant and remote. Physical 
closeness in social relationships is further associated 
with physical warmth and therefore indicates a 
positive social contact. Considerable evidence has 
accumulated to support the existence of these 
metaphors. But before reviewing this work, the 
theoretical framework is discussed that provided 
much of the basis for such investigations.  
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Metaphorical Groundings: The Theory of 
Conceptual Metaphor 
According to the theory of conceptual 
metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), the body is a 
source of knowledge, and by means of conceptual 
metaphors, very basic “embodied” concepts are 
mapped onto more abstract concepts. For instance, 
the spatial metaphor of verticality is used to contrast 
good and bad things, such as emotional feelings. 
For example, I might say that “I’m on top of the 
world”, or “feeling up”, or in contrast, note that 
“I’m down in the dumps”, or “fell into a depression.” 
Those mappings of physical body states are not 
arbitrary, but are correlated with what happens with 
the human body when one feels a certain emotion: 
An upright, relaxed posture when feeling happy, vs. 
a slumped, drooping posture when feeling depressed. 
Thus, metaphors systematically create similarities 
between source domains and target domains by 
mapping abstract concepts onto basic perceptual 
states. 
 Embodied metaphors are very prevalent in 
everyday talk, even if the bodily origin is often not 
easily evident. For instance, the metaphor TIME IS 
MONEY implies that time is regarded as a resource 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Such metaphorical 
expressions are usually not isolated instances, but 
are organized into highly coherent and elaborate 
systems. For example, some expressions emphasize 
that time is a limited resource (e.g., “using up time,” 
or “wasting time”), whereas other expressions 
emphasize that time is a valuable resource (e.g., 
“Thank you for your time.”). Both implications of 
the concepts systematically emphasize certain 
aspects of the metaphor and converge on the overall 
metaphor of TIME IS MONEY, which implies that 
people think of “using up” time in the same way as 
“using up” other resources, such as money. 
Importantly, the metaphorical expressions that treat 
abstract entities, such as time, as tangible things are 
not arbitrarily constructed, but are grounded in basic 
experiences of how the body interacts with the 
physical world. For example, a body uses resources, 
such as by eating and breathing, and thus, using up 
resources is a very basic embodied concept. Thus, 
although some metaphors might at first glance not 
have much of a bodily grounding, a closer 
examination can reveal that even seemingly abstract 
expressions relate back to specific physical 
experiences: By likening them to resources, very 
abstract things, such as time, are talked about in the 
same way as the very concrete things that the body 
consumes, such as food, or air.  
However, the similarities used for mapping 
structural relations from one domain to another 
domain are not objectively inherent in concepts or 
categories, but are the result of interactions with the 
world. This is a central point. Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) challenge the view that category 
membership is determined by objective, inherent 
properties of objects, and instead, propose that 
properties emerge from interactions with the 
physical and social environment. Those 
“interactional properties” of objects can include 
perceptual properties (e.g., what an apple looks 
like), functional properties (the apple satisfies an 
appetite), motor-activity properties (what it feels 
like to hold an apple in your hand while taking a 
bite of it), and purposive properties (eating fruit to 
stay healthy). Categories based on interactional 
properties do not have sharp boundaries, but are 
relatively open-ended. For example, tossing an 
apple from hand to hand can fall into the category 
“ball”, even though an apple typically does not 
generally fall into that category. Thus, in their 
“experientialist” approach Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1980; 1999) claim that objects can only be 
understood in relation to a particular perceptual and 
conceptual apparatus of the human body. 
Central to Lakoff and Johnson’s theory is 
the concept of “image schema” (Johnson, 1987), 
which describes a pattern of perceptual experience 
that emerges from very basic bodily activities, and 
which is non-propositional and analogue in nature. 
Image schemas result in mental representations with 
a level of abstractness less concrete than a mental 
picture, or a “rich” image, but still less abstract than 
propositional knowledge. The sensorimotor 
experience of using resources is one example of 
such an image schema; further examples are the 
concepts of containment, which is derived from the 
basic understanding of the human body as a 
container (some things are inside of the body, others 
are outside of it) and verticality (people are usually 
situated in an upright position within space, with a 
clear up-down orientation).  
Of course, the proposal that sensorimotor 
experiences and actions shape cognitive structure is 
not a new invention of cognitive science, but has 
been a prominent theme in developmental 
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psychology for quite some time (e.g., Werner & 
Kaplan, 1963). Based on a constructivist framework, 
Piaget (1980) was one of the pioneers to argue that 
information does not exist independently from the 
perceptual and interpretive cognitive system, but 
that the construction of meaning necessitates an 
active individual. Through direct, physical action 
with an object, very young children are able to 
abstract cognitive schemes that serve as “templates” 
against which new objects are standardized, or 
“assimilated”. New information derived from other 
objects allows for the scheme to be modified, or 
“adapted”, a process that becomes possible only 
through the active, constructive role of the 
individual. Similarly, Mandler (1992) outlines a 
theory of perceptual analysis by which children 
actively restructure, or redescribe, conceptual 
information abstracted from perceptual information. 
The outcome of this process, which takes place as 
early as in 3-4 month olds, is compacted preverbal 
information units, and what Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) termed image schemas, that involve 
mappings from sensorimotor activities. Recent work 
in social psychology has built on such early 
investigations, and for example, has applied the 
developmental notion of “scaffolding” (Bruner, 
1978; Vygotsky, 1978) to the learning processes 
that map physical experiences early in life to social 
phenomena (Williams, Huang & Bargh, 2009). 
However, as noted above, it would be helpful to 
know which embodied metaphors matter most, 
because they have shape the thoughts in many 
different abstract target domains.  
When examining the possibility of basic 
metaphors it is useful to consider which image 
schemas might enjoy a special status, based on 
which certain relatively universal metaphors might 
have evolved. On the most basic level, the human 
body is a particular object, namely a container with 
a discrete surface that delineates it from other 
objects, and other people. Two fundamental 
properties of this container relate to how it is 
situated in space, and how it moves in space. Thus, 
the following three image schemas might be 
especially central: First, the body functions in an 
upright, vertical position, second, it is a container 
that is separate from other entities, and third, the 
body maintains a given distance to other people and 
objects while moving in space. The meaning and 
ramifications of these image schemas (listed in 
Table 1) will be discussed in turn.  
 
Verticality: Being Upright in Space 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) articulated a 
theory based on which they developed a rich 
repertoire of metaphors. These include, for example, 
describing an argument as war, love as a journey, or 
time as money. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
proposed that a certain set of metaphors uses space 
as organizing principle in what they refer to as 
orientational metaphors. One central orientational 
metaphor is verticality. Experience in space, and 
spatial metaphors, are likely to serve a central 
function within metaphoric structure. Some of the 
spatial metaphors proposed by Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) were indeed the earliest conceptual 
metaphors to be put to the test by social 
psychologists. For example, Meier and Robinson 
(2004) demonstrated that people represent good 
things as spatially up, and bad things as spatially 
down. In their work participants were faster to 
categorize positive words such as “love” or “candy” 
as “good” when they were presented in the top 
section of a computer screen, and negative words 
such as “danger” or “spider” as “bad” when they 
were presented in the bottom section. Similarly, 
being powerful is associated with being high up in 
space, whereas being powerless is comparatively 
low (Schubert, 2005).  
Consistent with Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1980) early proposal, the vertical dimension that 
pulls the mind up to higher values originates from 
the very basic physical experience of verticality: 
People use the vertical dimension to contrast moral 
virtue and vice when talking about “high-minded” 
and “upstanding” citizens, versus the “low-life” of 
society. However, moral considerations and 
verticality are not as strongly associated for people 
who are not very concerned with social norms, 
namely those scoring high on measures of 
psychopathy (Meier, Sellbom, & Wygant, 2007). 
Further, when people feel metaphorically “uplifted” 
and “elevated” because of having witnessed another 
person’s morally exemplary behaviour, they are 
more likely to engage in prosocial behaviour 
themselves (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010). 
Moreover, participants considering acts of moral 
excellence not only express more “high-level” 
concepts such as abstract values, they also gaze up 
more in space while doing so than participants 
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considering acts of non-moral excellence (Pavarini, 
Schnall, & Immordino-Yang, 2012). Beyond 
valence, power, and morality, a further target 
domain that maps onto the source domain of 
verticality is divinity: Participants associate God 
with being high up in the sky, and the Devil as 
being down low in the underworld (Meier, Hauser, 
Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007).  
 All this evidence suggests that one single 
source domain, namely verticality, is sufficient to 
make sense of a broad variety of target domains. 
Thus, verticality may be considered a very central, 
core embodied concept, based on which many 
abstract concepts can be understood. Indeed, given 
the very limited number of direct physical 
experiences relative to the almost unlimited number 
of abstract concepts it is remarkable how efficiently 
the same source domain can be applied to vastly 
different cognitive concepts. Another such example 
of an embodied source domain with wide 
applicability is the notion of the body as an specific 
kind of object.  
 
The Body As A Container: Drawing The Line 
Between “In” And “Out” 
The fact that the body can be considered as a 
container with an inside and an outside has several 
implications. First, the language reflecting control 
and responsibility often describes the lack thereof as 
a force coming over, or getting into a person (“what 
has gotten into him?!”). In particular, emotions that 
are considered to involve the lack of rational 
thinking are talked about as some force acting 
within the bodily confines of a person. Within 
cognitive linguistics, the most comprehensive 
account of such embodied emotion metaphors has 
been developed by Zoltan Kövecses (1990; 2000). 
While investigating the general metaphors used in 
talking about emotions, he noted the centrality of 
the container metaphor in providing the basis for 
conceptualizing all kinds of objects as containers, 
with having an “inside” and “outside”. In the 
context of emotions, two spatial metaphors make 
use of the image schema of containment, namely 
that emotions are fluids in a container, and that 
emotions relate to the heat of the fluid in a container. 
The latter is especially important because it yields a 
number of metaphorical consequences, by 
describing emotions that involve a lack of control 
and that are often regarded as “typical” emotions, 
because they interrupt and disturb everyday 
functioning, such as anger or hatred.  
The metaphors referring to anger tend to 
reflect the physiological effects of anger, such as 
feeling hot and flushed. Heat of a fluid in a 
container is the source domain for the target domain 
of anger, and various “entailments” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980) follow. For example, when a person 
explodes, the “inside” of the person comes to the 
surface, suggesting that an authentic aspect of the 
person emerges that was previously “deep down” 
and hidden. Similar to anger, metaphors about fear 
correspond to physiological and behavioral aspects 
of fear. The notion of fluid in a container is used as 
well, but in contrast to anger, the fluid is not hot. 
Again, this is no coincidence, but correlates with the 
bodily experience of those emotions: Anger is 
experienced as hot, and is characterized by an 
increase in skin temperature, whereas the opposite 
is the case for fear (e.g., Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983). In the case of anger, the emotion 
develops inside the container, whereas in the case of 
fear, the emotion appears to be independent of the 
person, and then moves into the body as a result of 
some force (Kövecses, 1990).  
 If embodied metaphors indeed reflect the 
physiological experiences when feeling an emotion, 
then the same source domain (e.g., heat, when 
describing anger) should be used across cultures. 
Indeed, cross-language comparisons show that the 
concept of heat is central in linguistic expressions of 
anger not only in English, but also in Chinese (Yu, 
1995), and in Japanese, Hungarian, Wolof, Zulu, 
Polish (Kövecses, 2000). Similarly, if heat and 
anger are conceptually related, then activating one 
should simultaneously activate the other, and this 
has in fact been shown. Participants are better at 
categorizing anger-related word when presented 
with a background involving heat, compared to a 
cold, or neutral background image. Further, 
participants primed with anger provided higher 
estimates of average annual temperature for 
unfamiliar cities than participants primed with fear, 
or neutral words (Wilkowski, Meier, Robinson, 
Carter, & Feltman, 2009). The reverse relationship 
also holds: Priming participants with heat activates 
thoughts related to anger and aggression (DeWall & 
Bushman, 2009). Because one metaphorical 
entailment of anger and heat is the association with 
the color red, priming participants with the concept 
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of anger, or inducing the emotional state of anger 
facilitates the perception of redness (Fetterman, 
Robinson, Gordon, & Elliot, 2011).  
The container metaphor, especially when the 
fluid in the container is conceptualized as hot, 
mirrors the control aspect of emotion: The level of a 
fluid in a container rises as the intensity of the 
emotion rises, and as it gets too intense, the 
container explodes, reflecting that the person has to 
give up control over the emotion. Notably, it is 
perhaps less common to talk about the body as a 
container for emotions that do not involve high 
levels of physiological arousal, such as pride, or 
respect (Kövecses, 1990), nor do they usually exert 
a disturbing influence on everyday actions, and thus, 
they are considered less prototypical, or less “good” 
examples of emotion. 
 Not only specific emotions are talked about 
with reference to the metaphor of the body as a 
container, but language used to talk about emotions 
more generally consists of spatial language, such as 
“deep feelings”. The usage of this particular type of 
language can be traced back to properties of a 
container, because the deeper the container, the 
more substance in the form of fluid it can hold 
(Kövecses, 1990). In addition to more intense, 
“deep” can also mean “more sincere”, and is 
reflected in the fact that points farther away from 
the container surface are deep inside the container. 
Using the container metaphor thus exemplifies the 
more general principle of MORE IS UP: More fluid 
in the container stands for higher intensity of the 
emotion, or conversely, a lack of fluid (“I feel 
empty.”) indicates a lack of emotion.  
 
Keeping One’s Boundaries 
 The emotion that is most clearly concerned 
with maintaining the boundaries of the bodily 
container is disgust. On its most basic level, disgust 
has a functional role in the context of food 
consumption, that is, when it comes to which 
substances to physically incorporate by ingesting 
(Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). The rejection of 
potentially edible items that look, taste or smell bad 
is adaptive because it reduces the likelihood of 
consuming food that may be harmful to one’s 
health. Similarly, the potential of coming into 
contact with contaminated objects and surfaces is 
reduced in the face of reluctant physical contact due 
to feelings of disgust and repulsion. Behavioral 
responses of literally expelling bad-tasting food by 
spitting it out, or pulling up the nose in disgust to 
reduce the amount of airflow stemming from the 
contaminant (Susskind, Lee, Cusi, Feiman, Grabski, 
& Anderson, 2008) further ensure that potentially 
harmful substances do not enter the bodily 
container. The role of disgust in protecting the body 
of harm and contamination therefore has a clear 
bodily basis.  
Built on this, however, is a sense of disgust that 
goes beyond the realm of the bodily container 
because it extends to metaphorical contamination: 
Not only bad food makes us feel repulsed and sick 
to the stomach, the same is the case for bad people 
and their bad, repulsive behaviors. In other words, 
in addition to physical disgust another sense of 
disgust involves moral disgust (Rozin et al., 2008), 
and it is likely that the two have a very close 
metaphorical link. Indeed, functional neuroimaging 
studies suggest that the same brain structures may 
be implicated in the experience of physical and 
moral disgust (Moll et al., 2005; Schaich Borg, 
Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008). Further, inductions of 
physical disgust change judgments and decisions 
involving moral disgust (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & 
Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). For 
example, in one study my colleagues and I exposed 
some participants to a bad smell in the form of “fart 
spray.” Participants who sensed this disgusting 
smell judged various moral transgressions, such as 
falsifying a resume or not returning a lost wallet, to 
be more wrong than participants not exposed to the 
smell. Similarly, in a different study, participants 
who happened to sit at a disgusting table and were 
surrounded by dirty pizza boxes and used tissues 
made more severe moral judgments than 
participants sitting at the same table when it was 
clean and untainted (Schnall, Haidt et al., 2008). 
Further, people’s spontaneous facial expression are 
similar toward physically and morally disgusting 
stimuli (Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011; Chapman, 
Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009). These findings 
suggest that people often equate physical disgust 
and moral disgust, such as when experimentally 
induced feelings of repulsion are taken as evidence 
of moral condemnation. The conflation of physical 
and social disgust seems to take place especially 
when the metaphor of the body as a container is 
made salient. Landau, Sullivan and Greenberg 
(2009) showed that after describing the United 
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States in ways that highlighted its properties as a 
bodily entity, participants exposed to contamination 
fears were especially likely to express concerns 
about foreign immigration. Thus, physical and 
metaphorical notions of containment are closely 
linked.  
Related to the function of disgust as 
guardian of the body’s actual and metaphorical 
boundaries against physical and moral 
contamination, studies have investigated the link 
between physical and moral purity. Experiments 
have documented the so-called “Macbeth Effect,” 
named after Lady Macbeth who attempted to rinse 
off the imaginary stains of murder. After having 
considered their past immoral actions, participants 
found cleansing products to be more attractive, and 
expressed a greater desire to wash themselves 
(Zhong & Liljenquest, 2006). Further, different 
types of transgression lead to different kinds of 
cleansing desires: After speaking immoral things 
people want to use mouthwash, but after typing 
something immoral using a computer keyboard 
people want to use a hand-sanitizer (Lee & Schwarz, 
2010a). Further, being primed with words related to 
cleanliness or engaging in hand washing can 
influence moral judgments, and make moral 
judgments less harsh when participants interpret 
feelings of cleanliness to be relevant to specific 
transgressions (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008), 
but more harsh when the cleanliness is seen as 
indicative of one’s own superior moral standing 
(Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010).  
Moving beyond the immediate need to 
protect one’s bodily boundaries, recent findings 
suggest that the effects of cleansing can go beyond 
the moral domain. For example, a form of cognitive 
dissonance, namely nagging doubts about whether 
one made the right decision, can be reduced by 
hand-washing (Lee & Schwarz, 2010b). However, 
not only negative states can be removed, but 
physical cleansing can also get rid of positive states, 
such as one’s sense of having a “lucky streak” (Xu, 
Zwick, & Schwarz, 2012). In this sense, physically 
cleansing the body can serve as a “reset” button for 
the mind.  
 
Actual and Metaphorical Distance in Space and 
Time 
As reviewed in the previous section, on a 
very basic level the human body is a container with 
a clearly delineated inside and outside. Smith 
(2008) discussed how Aron, Aron, Tudor and 
Nelson’s (1991) notion of self-other overlap is a 
fundamentally embodied concept: Once another 
person is “close”, the distinction between self and 
body, and that of the other, breaks down. Terms 
such as “in-group” or “out-group” further denote the 
distinction between those who we keep so close that 
they almost seem part of the self, compared to those 
who are not. Because each person is separated from 
the surrounding world by a skin, we see objects as 
possessing boundaries even if they are not clearly 
defined: A peak in a mountain range might appear 
as a distinct entity and be labelled as such, even if 
its boundary from the rest of the geological 
structure is fuzzy at best. Overall, the tendency to 
impose real and metaphorical boundaries implies 
that some things are close, whereas others are not.  
On the most basic level physical distance 
reflects the extent to which objects and people are 
brought close and within reach, or are kept at 
“arm’s length.” Indeed, approach and avoidance are 
considered some of the most basic behavioral 
tendencies (e.g., Elliot, 2008). Distance is further 
used metaphorically to denote social relationships, 
for example, by speaking of a close contact, versus 
a distant acquaintance. These metaphors reflect how 
people move and act in space as a reflection of 
specific social relationships. Indeed, people get 
close to intimate others to whom they feel close 
(Patterson, 1977; Willis, 1966), but they literally 
distance themselves from others who are seen as 
less attractive, such as people marked by a physical 
stigma (Kleck, 1968), as if one is afraid that too 
close of a contact might literally pose the danger of 
the stigma “rubbing off”.  
In general, people feel highly protective of 
the area of space immediately around them that has 
been termed “personal space” (Hall, 1968). 
Discomfort results when this space is invaded, and 
people engage in compensatory behaviors by 
reducing other indicators of intimacy, such as eye 
gaze (Argyle & Dean, 1965). Thus, social factors 
constrain how people act and move in physical 
space, and this has consequences for how this space 
is perceived. Distances are perceived very 
differently depending on whether they imply 
entities that are considered part of one’s in-group, or 
instead, an out-group (Kerkman, Stea, Norris, & 
Rice, 2004; Burris & Branscombe, 2005). For 
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instance, distances that involve crossing the borders 
between participants’ home country (e.g., the U.S.) 
into a foreign country (e.g., Mexico) are estimated 
as greater than distances within the home country 
(Burris & Branscombe, 2005). Similarly, 
participants estimate distances between city pairs 
that used to be separated by the “Iron Curtain”, with 
one city located within East Germany and the other 
city located within West Germany, to be greater 
than distances of cities located within the same 
areas of Germany (Carbon & Leder, 2005). This 
overestimation was greatest for participants who 
had a negative attitude toward the reunification of 
Germany, presumably reflecting a strong personal 
sense of the county’s social and political boundaries. 
Findings such as these suggest that rather 
than being objectively determined by a low-level 
modular process that takes place in a 
“computationally encapsulated” (Fodor, 1983) 
manner, visual processes such as estimating small-
scale distances on maps are constrained by various 
contextual factors, which can include social and 
cognitive variables. On a more broad level, visual 
perceptions of various kinds, including those of the 
physical environment, relate back to how people 
and their bodies use space, and how they act in 
space. Such considerations can shape how close or 
far objects appear, because the visual perception of 
distance takes into account how easy or difficult it 
would be to reach a target object, given one’s bodily 
capabilities (Proffitt, 2006). For example, while 
wearing a heavy backpack objects placed within a 
few meters from participants appear farther away 
than when not wearing such a backpack (Proffitt, 
Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003). Presumably, 
the physical state of being weighted down is 
indicative of how easy or difficult it would be to 
cover a distance, and it therefore shapes how close 
or far a given target appears. Similarly, because the 
effort involved in throwing a heavy ball participants 
is greater than the effort involved in throwing a light 
ball, after throwing the heavy ball distances appear 
to be farther (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004). In 
addition to relative difficulty or effort of engaging 
with an object, motivational states relating to the 
desirability to objects also change perceptual 
affordances. Balcetis and Dunning (2010) showed 
that desirable objects, such as a glass of water when 
one is thirsty, appear as closer than undesirable 
objects; such a perceptual bias would presumably 
facilitate the goal-relevant action of approaching the 
object, such as grabbing the glass of water in order 
to quench one’s thirst.  
 
Psychological Distance 
As reviewed in detail above, the theory of 
conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 
1999) proposes that physical experiences are linked 
with abstract concepts through embodied metaphors. 
Thus, there is a basic distinction between a concrete 
experience, for example, the actual distance to an 
object in space, and an abstract concept, for 
example, the subjective valence assigned to this 
object. In a somewhat similar way, construal level 
theory (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & 
Liberman, 2010) proposes a fundamental distinction 
regarding what is termed psychological distance: 
Experiences can be concrete, immediate and 
happening at the present moment, or in contrast, be 
abstract, distant and remote. As a consequence, 
psychological distance involves different mental 
representations of events, such that thinking about 
the here and now involves concrete, low-level 
construals tied to direct perceptual experience, 
whereas thinking about distant places, other people, 
or one’s future self involves abstract, high-level 
construals that are detached from current experience. 
Accumulating evidence suggests that people 
process the same kind of information differently 
depending on metaphorical distance and resulting 
construal level. Relative to events and situations 
that are psychological “close,” taking a more 
“removed” psychological perspective facilitates 
abstract and global processing (e.g., Liberman & 
Förster, 2009; Henderson, Fujita, Trope & 
Liberman, 2006; Williams & Bargh, 2006). For 
example, abstract moral principles are more likely 
to be emphasized over situational constraints when 
participants use a high-level construal rather than a 
low-level construal (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 
2008), and moral transgressions are condemned 
more in the distant future than in the near future, 
presumably because high-level construals make 
abstract moral values especially salient (Agerström 
& Björklund, 2009). Further, increased 
psychological distance can lead to better economic 
decisions, such as a greater focus on long-term 
benefits over short-term benefits (Kim, Schnall, & 
White, 2012), or the enhanced goal of maximizing 
financial gains in an economic game (Kim, Schnall, 
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Yi & White, 2012). These findings suggest that a 
distant psychological perspective and its associated 
high level construal may literally help people “step 
back” from the immediate concerns and instead, 
focus on more abstract, “higher-level” goals.  
Construal level theory notes that the central 
construct of psychological distance manifests itself 
in various domains, including space (close vs. far), 
time (now vs. later), social distance (self vs. other) 
and hypothetical distance (likely vs. unlikely) 
(Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007). Indeed, all 
four dimensions of psychological distance are 
highly correlated (Fiedler, Jung, Wänke, & 
Alexopoulos, 2012). Liberman and Förster (2011), 
however, raise the issue of whether spatial distance 
might be more primary, and therefore more basic 
than other types of psychological distance. As 
reviewed above, this is likely to be the case, given 
that physical space provides the perceptual source 
domain for many other target domains. Thus, spatial 
distance serves as the source domain for other, more 
metaphorical types of psychological distance, such 
as temporal distance or social distance. Indeed, the 
way in which space facilitates thinking about time is 
well documented (Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky & 
Ramscar, 2002). Overall, findings derived from the 
construal level framework suggest that 
psychological distance is a fundamental dimension 
that is used to organize experiences and concepts, 
thus lending support to the notion that distance, 
whether concrete or abstract, constitutes a 
fundamental embodied metaphor.  
 
Being Close = Being Warm 
 As noted previously, physical and 
metaphorical closeness is indicative of immediate 
experiences and concerns. Because it means 
potentially putting oneself in danger, we only let 
those people get close toward whom we are 
favorably disposed. Being close therefore often 
coincides with close bodily contact, or touching. In 
his seminal work Bowlby (1969) noted that the 
close relationship between infant and caregiver 
provides a critical relationship template for future 
romantic relationships, and such close primary 
relationships are characterized by close physical 
contact and warmth. Thus, from very early on in 
childhood feeling warm becomes synonymous with 
being cared for and loved by others. Indeed, Fiske, 
Cuddy and Glick (2007) have proposed that when 
making evaluations about other people, one of the 
two most basic dimensions, along with judgments 
of competence, is the judgment of how warm and 
friendly that person is. Thus, warmth is a basic 
perceptual concept that grows out of the 
understanding that relative to one’s own bodily 
boundaries, we keep those whom we like so close 
that we can sense the warmth radiating from them.  
 Just like physical and moral purity can 
become conflated, as noted above (Zhong & 
Liljenquist, 2006; Schnall, Benton et al., 2008), 
physical and interpersonal warmth can become 
conflated. For example, research participants rated a 
neutral stranger as more warm and friendly after 
holding a cup containing a hot drink compared to 
after holding a cold drink (Williams & Bargh, 2008). 
Similarly, research participants express more 
relational thinking in a warm relative to a cold room 
(IJzerman & Semin, 2009). Looking at the reverse 
relationship, participants who were made to feel 
lonely and excluded rated the ambient room 
temperature to be colder than those who felt 
accepted, and presumably “warm” (Zhong, & 
Leonardelli, 2008). As a means of emotional self-
regulation, experienced loneliness can be 
ameliorated by seeking out warm comfort in the 
form of a hot bath or shower (Bargh & Shalev, 
2012).  
Thus, interpersonal closeness seems to be 
closely associated with warmth. Fay and Maner (in 
press) found direct evidence for precisely this link. 
They had participants hold a warm or cold cup of 
coffee, and then estimate the distance to the cup. 
Participants low in avoidant attachment saw the 
warm cup as closer than the cold cup, whereas 
participants high in avoidant attachment showed the 
opposite effect. A second study further showed that 
when feelings of warmth were induced, participants 
were more likely to report a desire to be close to 
others, but again this effect was moderated by 
attachment style, with only participant low in 
avoidant attachment demonstrating this connection. 
The association between warmth and proximity, and 
the moderating effect of attachment styles indicates 
that such a connection is not innate or invariate, but 
at least to some extent is shaped by specific 
experience. Thus, warmth originating from a 
caregiver early in life is the result of being “close” 
to this person.   
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Other Basic Metaphors? 
I have argued for a given set of bodily images 
schemas and resulting metaphorical concepts to be 
central. However, what is the reason to believe that 
other embodied concepts are less central? Much of 
what was discussed concerned potential basic 
metaphors derived from how the human body is 
situated and functions within space. In addition, 
information from different sensory modalities may 
provide fundamental source domains for potential 
use with abstract target domains. Although human 
beings take in information about the surrounding 
world through five distinct senses, namely vision, 
audition, taste, smell and touch, it is well 
established that vision is much more important for 
human beings than is the sense of audition, or smell. 
As a consequence, it is likely that specific visual 
experiences, such as the light of dawn and sunshine 
are experienced positively across practically all 
cultures, whereas the darkness and potential danger 
of night is universally experienced negatively. A 
reflection of this importance of telling light from 
dark, such as day from night, is that all language 
communities studied to date have distinct terms for 
‘black’ and ‘white’, even if they lack words for 
other colors (Berlin & Kay, 1969). Thus, it is likely 
that findings with Western samples suggesting a 
positive valence of brightness, relative to darkness 
(Meier, Robinson & Clore, 2004; Sherman & Clore, 
2009) also hold for non-Western samples.  
Visual cues of light and dark are more likely 
to cross-culturally represent similar metaphoric 
ideas than, for example, specific smells that are 
associated with moral connotations. Indeed, Lee and 
Schwarz (in press) recently showed that while the 
specific smell of “fishy” is linked with something 
being suspicious, this expression is not necessarily 
universal across cultures. Thus, while it may be that 
unpleasant smells of various kinds are linguistically 
reflected as spelling trouble, because the sense of 
smell is less central than the sense of vision, there is 
cultural variability in what particular type of smell 
has a suspicious meaning attached to it.   
Most important in this context will be cross-
cultural investigations using the metaphoric transfer 
strategy described by Landau and colleagues (2010) 
that has been so productively used with Western 
samples. As reviewed elsewhere (Casasanto, this 
volume; Leung, Qiu, Ong, & Tam, 2011), some 
findings already suggest that some embodied 
metaphors hold across various cultural 
communities.  
 
Conclusion 
 Embodied approaches to language and 
cognition propose that all thought processes need to 
be conceptualized as taking place in the service of 
embodied action that is contextually constrained. 
Such a view suggests that cognition depends heavily 
on perceptual and interactional processes of the 
human body in the physical world. The most 
fundamental such bodily experiences are based on 
the fact that the body is a container that moves in 
space. It is a bounded entity that has a surface. 
Objects and people are positioned at varying 
distances to the body, and the distance to them is 
manipulated depending on action goals. This 
chapter has proposed a list of potentially basic 
metaphors that result from these set of fundamental 
images schemas that are grounded in physical 
experience. In contrast to Ekman’s (1992b) forceful 
conclusion that there definitely are basic emotions, 
for now, the conclusion regarding the existence of 
basic metaphors needs to remain somewhat more 
tentative and speculative. Based on the existing 
evidence a number of basic metaphors is likely, but 
further evidence needs to test more directly such 
proposed universality.    
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Table 1 
Basic Embodied Source Domains and Corresponding Abstract Target Domains 
Source Domain Aspect of Source Domain Target Domain Sample Articles 
VERTICALITY   
Valence 
Power 
Morality 
Divinity 
 
Meier & Robinson (2004) 
Schubert (2005) 
Meier, Sellbom et al. (2007) 
Meier, Hauser et al. (2007)  
CONTAINER 
 
 
Depth of Container 
Heat of Fluid in Container 
 
Emotion 
Anger 
 
Kövecses (2000) 
Wilkowski et al. (2009) 
 
 
 
 
DISTANCE 
 
Maintaining Boundaries 
 
 
Closeness 
Warmth 
Distance 
Disgust 
Cleanliness 
 
Intimacy 
Intimacy 
Abstraction 
Schnall, Haidt et al. (2008) 
Zhong & Liljenquist (2006) 
 
Argyle & Dean (1965) 
Williams & Bargh (2008) 
Trope & Liberman (2010) 
  
 
 
